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THE BOOGEYMAN: DEREK BOOGAARD AND 
THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF SECTION 301 
PREEMPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note focuses on the preemptive effect of section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA)1 in the suit against the National 
Hockey League (NHL) by the Estate of former NHL player Derek 
Boogaard.2 The Note will contrast Boogaard v. National Hockey League, in 
which section 301 preempted the Estate’s negligence claims, with several 
National Football League (NFL) cases. Boogaard will also be contrasted 
with In re National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, 
a similar case brought by a class of NHL players in which the court declared 
that section 301 did not preempt claims for negligence at the motion to 
dismiss stage.3 The following analysis of section 301 preemption and 
Boogaard will reveal inequities and flaws inherent in section 301 
preemption that should be removed by Congress. It also analyzes avenues 
future litigants may pursue to circumvent section 301 preemption 
altogether.    
First, this Note will discuss Derek Boogaard’s career as an NHL 
enforcer. Then, it will explain the history of the LMRA and section 301 
preemption. A synopsis of relevant NFL cases will follow and provide 
examples of when section 301 has, and has not, preempted negligence 
claims brought by former players. Next, the Note will analyze Boogaard 
and contrast its outcome with the aforementioned NFL cases. An analysis 
of Concussion Injury will follow that discusses why its outcome differed 
from Boogaard. Finally, this Note will argue that the preemptive effect of 
section 301 did not serve its intended purpose in Boogaard and that 
Congress should place restrictions in its application—such as extending the 
statute of limitations period—and show how future NHL players can apply 
lessons learned from Boogaard and Concussion Injury to circumvent 
section 301 preemption in state-law tort claims.  
																																								 																				
1. Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides an avenue for an employee to sue their employer for 
breach of a contract, such as a collective bargaining agreement. Section 301 provides: “Suits for violation 
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry 
affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought 
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount 
in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” Labor Management Relations (Taft-
Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012). 
2.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
3.  In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856 (D. Minn. 
2016). 
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I. MEET THE BOOGEYMAN, DEREK BOOGAARD 
During the 1987–88 NHL season, players engaged in an astounding 
1,183 fights in 841 games—an average of approximately 1.31 fights per 
game.4 The number of fights has decreased significantly over the years, with 
a fight occurring only about once in three NHL games during the 2015–16 
season.5 Many of these bouts are fought by enforcers, players who “are seen 
as working-class superheroes—understated types with an alter ego willing 
to do the sport’s most dangerous work to protect others. And they are 
underdogs, men who otherwise might have no business in the game.”6  
In a 2011 poll, NHL players voted Minnesota Wild enforcer Derek 
Boogaard as the league’s toughest player.7 Known as “The Boogeyman” 
since his days as a minor league hockey player,8 the intimidating and 
physically imposing 6’7”, 265 lb. Boogaard almost didn’t make the NHL.9 
But after making his NHL debut in 2005, Boogaard proceeded to play in the 
NHL for six years with the Minnesota Wild and New York Rangers.10 
During that time, Boogaard played in 277 NHL games, logging three goals 
and thirteen assists and amassing 589 penalty minutes—an impressive 
number for someone who played sparingly in a limited number of games.11 
On May 13, 2011, Boogaard’s life and NHL career came to a tragic end 
																																								 																				
4.  NHL Fights per Game, Year-by-Year, DROP YOUR GLOVES, http://dropyourgloves.com/Fi 
ghts/FightsPerGameChart.aspx?League=1 (last visited Aug. 18, 2017). 
5.  Id. There were 395 fights in 1,230 NHL games—an average of 0.32 fights per game. 
6.  John Branch, Derek Boogaard: Blood on the Ice, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-blood-on-the-ice.html?pagewa 
nted=4&_r=0. 
7.  The Best and Worst, A Hockey Players’ Poll, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Jan. 30, 2011, 10:20 
PM), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/ahockey-players-poll/article564149/ (asking 
318 players a set of questions). 
8.  See Neil Davidson, The Sad Rise and Fall of Derek Boogaard, The Canadian Press, GLOBAL 
NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://globalnews.ca/news/1603417/the-sad-rise-and-fall-of-hockeys-derek-
boogaard/ (describing how scouts for a Western Hockey League team, the Regina Pats, claimed 
Boogaard’s junior rights and nicknamed him “The Boogeyman”); see also Branch, supra note 6 (stating 
that when Boogaard played for the Houston Aeros of the American Hockey League—an affiliate of the 
Minnesota Wild and one rung below the NHL level—the Aeros would replay Boogaard’s fights on the 
video board, labeled the “Boogeyman Cam”).  
9.  Branch, supra note 6 (“Boogaard had size and determination, but not much else, when the 
Wild chose him in the seventh round of the 2001 N.H.L. draft. He trained with a Russian figure skater. 
He continued lessons to bolster his boxing. He was sent for seasoning in the minor leagues, where Wild 
officials told the coaches to mold Boogaard into an N.H.L. enforcer . . . . ‘We didn’t give him a chance, 
and we were the guys trying to help him,’ said Matt Shaw, who coached Boogaard in the minor leagues 
and the N.H.L. ‘Give him credit. This guy willed his way to the N.H.L.’”). 
10.  Derek Boogaard, NHL, https://www.nhl.com/player/derek-boogaard-8469647?stats=career 
-r-nhl&season=20102011 (last visited Aug. 18, 2017). Boogaard played for the Rangers during the 
2010–11 season after playing five seasons with the Minnesota Wild. Id. 
11.  Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/5
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] THE BOOGEYMAN  729 
 
 
	
when he died of an accidental pain medication overdose at the age of 
twenty-eight.12  
Like other enforcers, Derek Boogaard struggled with injuries and 
attempted to conceal the many concussions he likely sustained during his 
NHL career.13 His troubles with pain medication addiction began during the 
2007–08 season with the Minnesota Wild, when doctors prescribed 
Boogaard pain medicine for his ailing back.14 Engaging in fights and 
exposing himself to the dangers inherent in playing in the NHL only 
exacerbated the issue, as “Derek would have teeth knocked out and be 
prescribed vast amounts of painkillers by team doctors.”15 The following 
year, doctors prescribed Boogaard with Percocet (a combination of 
acetaminophen and oxycodone) after he underwent surgery on his nose and 
shoulder.16 Whether as a result of medication or concussions, Boogaard’s 
mental state began to suffer.17 Later in 2009, “a doctor asked Boogaard to 
name every word he could think of that began with the letter R. He could 
not come up with any.”18  
NHL team physicians “prescribed Boogaard a total of 1,021 pills during 
the 2008–09 season with the Minnesota Wild.”19 Boogaard’s drug addiction 
ultimately led to his admittance into the NHL’s Substance Abuse Behavioral 
Health Program (SABH) in 2009.20 Yet even while enrolled in the SABH, 
“there was little communication between doctors, so [Boogaard] would get 
a prescription from one doctor and then go to another for more pills.”21  
After participating in an “Aftercare Program” upon release from the 
SABH, Boogaard ultimately relapsed in 2010.22 Despite being notified of 
																																								 																				
12.  Davidson, supra note 8.  
13.  See Branch, supra note 6 (“There is no incentive to display weakness. Most enforcers do not 
acknowledge concussions, at least until they retire. Teams, worried that opponents will focus on sore 
body parts, usually disguise concussions on injury reports as something else. In Boogaard’s case, it was 
often ‘shoulder’ or ‘back,’ two chronic ailments . . . .”). 
14.  Id. Boogaard’s back troubles likely began in the minor leagues, where “his back was so 
perpetually sore that he once could not stand up after lacing his skates.” Id. 
15.       Davidson, supra note 8.   
16.  Branch, supra note 6. Boogaard had nose surgery, then surgery on his shoulder seven days 
later. Id.  
17.  Id. At one point, “a neurologist asked Boogaard to estimate how many times his mind went 
dark and he needed a moment to regain his bearings after being hit on the head, probable signs of a 
concussion. Four? Five? Boogaard laughed. Try hundreds, he said.” Id. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Melanie Romero, Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer, Derek Boogaard, 
and the NHL's Negligence—How Enforcers Are Treated as Second-Class Employees, 22 JEFFREY S. 
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 271, 274 (2015). 
20.  Id. at 282.  
21.  Davidson, supra note 8. At one point, “Boogaard had at least 25 prescriptions for oxycodone 
and hydrocodone, a total of 622 pills from 10 doctors—eight Wild doctors, an oral surgeon in 
Minneapolis and a doctor from another team.” Id. 
22.  Romero, supra note 19, at 282. See also John Branch, In Hockey Enforcer’s Descent, a 
Flood of Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/0 
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the relapse by Boogaard’s father, NHL physicians still prescribed Boogaard 
366 pills during the 2010–11 season.23 After six positive urine tests for 
Oxymorphone, Hydromorphone, and Hydrocode, the NHL finally admitted 
Boogaard into the SABH’s Authentic Recovery Center for opioid 
dependence.24 Even though Boogaard “resisted treatment and showed 
indifference in therapy sessions,” he was released on his own recognizance 
“to attend his sister’s college graduation.”25 One day later, Boogaard was 
found dead after he overdosed on pain medications.26  
Posthumous tests indicated that Boogaard suffered from Chronic 
Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE), a progressive neuro-degenerative 
disease.27 CTE is likely caused, at least in part, by concussions.28 The tests 
revealed that CTE mostly affected the areas of Boogaard’s brain that 
“controlled judgment, inhibition, mood, behavior, and impulse control.”29  
Boogaard’s Estate filed state-law negligence claims in Illinois against 
the NHL for failure to prevent over-prescription of addictive medications, 
failure to provide Boogaard with a chaperone upon his temporary release 
from the Authentic Recovery Center, and failure to warn Boogaard of the 
risks associated with leaving the facility.30 The Estate also alleged that the 
NHL negligently monitored Boogaard for brain trauma during his career, 
ultimately leading to Boogaard’s death.31 On a motion to remand the case 
to state court, the court analyzed two of the Estate’s claims and held that 
section 301—which provides an avenue for an employee to bring suit 
against their employer for a breach of contract between the employer and 
the employee’s labor union—completely preempted those claims.32 
																																								 																				
4/sports/hockey/in-hockey-enforcers-descent-a-flood-of-prescription-drugs.html (noting that 
Boogaard’s father spoke with a Rangers senior official in October, 2010 about Boogaard’s “renewed 
drug problem.”). 
23.  Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 8 (Boogaard was “still getting pills from Wild doctors” 
after he signed with the Rangers).  
24.  Romero, supra note 19, at 282–83.  
25.  Id at 283. However, it is interesting to note that an NHL substance abuse counselor 
exchanged seven texts with Boogaard the night before he died. Davidson, supra note 8.  
26.  Romero, supra note 19, at 283. 
27.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1015 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
28.  Mayo Clinic Staff, Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, MAYO CLINIC, 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/chronic-traumatic-encephalopathy/basics/definition/co 
n-20113581 (last visited Aug. 18, 2017). Note that “CTE is a very controversial condition that is still 
not well understood. Researchers do not yet know the frequency of CTE in the population and do not 
understand the causes.” Id. 
29.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1015–16. 
30.  Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F. Supp. 3d 650, 655 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
31.  Id. at 653. 
32.  Id. at 652. The court only analyzed Counts III and IV to determine whether to remand the 
case to Illinois state court. Because the court found that Counts III and IV were preempted by section 
301, it denied the Estate’s motion to remand. Id. at 658–59. “Complete” preemption occurs where 
“certain federal statutes are construed to have such ‘extraordinary’ preemptive force that state-law claims 
coming within the scope of the federal statute are transformed, for jurisdictional purposes, into federal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/5
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Because the NHL’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governed 
player safety, the preempted claims would need to be based on a breach of 
contract under section 301.33 After the subsequent court in Boogaard 
determined that the remaining claims were also preempted by section 301, 
the Estate was left with no recourse or relief on those claims because the 
statute of limitations had already run.34 
II. HISTORY OF THE LMRA 
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) “to give 
employees the right to collective bargaining.”35 It can preempt state 
regulation when such regulation “interferes with the rights and duties of 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement.”36 Section 301 of the LMRA 
provides an avenue for an employee to sue their employer for a violation of 
a CBA.37 By enacting section 301, Congress intended to provide federal 
courts with jurisdiction to enforce CBAs and to “compel uniformity in the 
application of federal labor law.”38  
Congress’s power to preempt is derived from the Commerce Clause of 
the United States Constitution, which allows Congress “to regulate labor 
relations in industries affecting interstate commerce.”39 Preemption occurs 
where “a local regulation ‘ . . . conflicts with federal law or would frustrate 
the federal scheme.’”40 Therefore, section 301 preempts a “state rule that 
purports to define the meaning or scope of a term in a contract suit” to ensure 
																																								 																				
claims—i.e., completely preempted.” Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 424 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Complete preemption differs from “ordinary” preemption in that a case cannot be removed from state 
court to federal court if the defendant raises an ordinary preemption defense. Id. at 273; see also 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987).  
33.  Id. at 657–58. 
34.      See infra notes 183 and 186; see also Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1027.  
35.  Robert E. Oakes, Miller v. AT&T Network Systems: Toward Consistency in Collective 
Bargaining Agreement Preemption of State Law Causes of Action, 21 PAC. L. J. 201, 204 (1989). 
36.  Id. at 205. 
37.  Tara Selver, Labor Law—The United States Supreme Court Alters National Labor Policy: 
Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 16 N.M. L. REV. 153, 153 (1986) (noting that “Section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act provides the basis for an employee’s right to sue the employer for 
violation of a collective bargaining agreement.”); see also Martha E. Lipchitz, Section 301 of Labor 
Management Act Preempts State Discrimination Claims Requiring Interpretation of Corresponding 
Agreements—Fant v. New England Power Service Co., 239 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2001), 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 429, 429 (2001) (stating that section 301 “provides a federal cause of action in suits alleging 
violations of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)”). 
38.  Oakes, supra note 35, at 206; see also Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) 
(concluding that “in enacting § 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail 
over inconsistent local rules”).  
39.  Oakes, supra note 35, at 202–03. The Supremacy Clause also provides Congress with the 
power to preempt. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) (“Congress’ power to pre-
empt state law is derived from the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Federal Constitution.”). 
40. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 
(1978)).  
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uniformity of enforcement.41 For instance, “when resolution of a state law 
claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement 
made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be 
treated as a § 301 claim . . . or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-
contract law.”42  
Initially, section 301 only preempted suits that alleged contract 
violations.43 However, as the Court in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck 
elucidated, “if the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their proper 
range . . . the pre-emptive effect of § 301 must extend beyond suits alleging 
contract violations.”44 That Court worried that litigants could otherwise 
circumvent the application of section 301 by masking contract claims as tort 
claims, thereby evading the uniform application of federal labor law.45 For 
instance, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., the plaintiff 
argued that her employer retaliated against her for filing a worker’s 
compensation claim, which constituted a state-law tort.46 The Seventh 
Circuit held that section 301 preempted the plaintiff’s retaliatory discharge 
claim because “the facts underlying that claim were the same as those 
applicable to a grievance under the just cause provision of the [CBA].”47 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating:  
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a [CBA], on the one hand, or 
state law, on the other, would require addressing precisely the same 
set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be resolved without 
interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the 
agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes.48 
Therefore, preemption will not necessarily result when a labor contract 
(such as a CBA) provides an employee with “a remedy for conduct that also 
																																								 																				
41.  Id. at 210. 
42.  Id. at 220. Section 301 enjoys a particularly broad scope because it was designed to favor 
arbitration. Arbitrators, and not the courts, are vested with authority to interpret labor contracts. 
Therefore, the “preference for arbitration further ensures that federal rather than state law will govern 
the construction of labor contracts.” Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment 
Law Preemption, 13 LAB. L. 429, 435 (1998).  
43.  Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 202. 
44.  Id. at 210. According to the Court, “questions relating to what parties to a labor agreement 
agreed, and what legal consequences were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, must be 
resolved by reference to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for 
breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.” Id. at 211. In Allis-Chalmers, the plaintiff brought 
a state-law tort claim against her employer, Allis-Chalmers, for bad-faith handling of an insurance claim. 
Id. at 205–06. Plaintiff filed a disability claim with the insurance company after getting injured on the 
job. Id. at 205. His claim was approved, and he received disability benefits, but Allis-Chalmers allegedly 
interfered with the payments. Id.  
45.  Id. at 212. 
46.  486 U.S. 399, 399 (1988).  
47.  Befort, supra note 42, at 435. 
48.  Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409–10. 
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violates state law.”49 Instead, preemption is only limited to circumstances in 
which courts are required to interpret the CBA to resolve the claim.50 That 
is, if resolution of the claim requires the court to interpret the CBA itself, 
then the claim is preempted; however, if the claim can be resolved without 
interpreting the CBA, then the claim will not be preempted.51 As the Court 
in Allis-Chalmers asserted, section 301 will preempt a tort claim that is 
“inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor 
contract.”52 
Thus, the analysis appears to be straightforward—whenever a state-law 
claim, including claims for tortious conduct, necessarily requires an 
interpretation of the CBA’s provisions in order to be resolved, the claim is 
preempted by section 301. However, as the following analysis of NFL cases 
and Boogaard will demonstrate, section 301 preemption can result in 
unforeseen and likely unintended negative consequences for litigants. 
III. DIFFERING RESULTS REGARDING SECTION 301 PREEMPTION FOR 
STATE/COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION IN NFL CASES 
Prior to Boogaard, several NFL players or their estates filed suit against 
the NFL and their respective teams for tortious conduct, including their 
failure to warn about the risks of concussions.53 Many of these claims 
alleged that the NFL was negligent, and several cases demonstrated that 
even with a CBA in place, section 301 may not preempt those claims when 
a lack of connection exists between the claims and the CBA. Reasons that 
negated section 301 preemption included: 1) the NFL’s duties owed to the 
players did not arise out of the CBA;54 2) the CBA did not require a player 
to receive treatment at an NFL team’s facility;55 and 3) while the NFL’s 
duty owed to the player could be ascertained by examining the NFL’s legal 
relationship with the player as established by the CBA, a separate state-law 
																																								 																				
49.  Befort, supra note 42, at 435. 
50.  Id. Claims typically preempted by section 301 include: “a. Claims concerning benefits 
provided under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement; b. Contract claims alleging that the 
employer breached a promise to an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement; c. Tort 
claims alleging a failure of a union to fulfill duties under a collective bargaining agreement to maintain 
a safe working environment; and d. Claims alleging a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.” Id. at 436. 
51.  See Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(“If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the applicable CBA . . . it is preempted. 
Alternatively, if the claim may be litigated without reference to the rights and duties established in a 
CBA . . . it is not preempted.”).  
52.  Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).  
53.  See Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and Section 
301 Preemption, 102 GEO L.J. 1841, 1855 (2014). 
54.  Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2014). 
55.  Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 958 N.E.2d 585, 590 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
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claim also clearly defined the duties owed by the NFL to their players, 
independent of the CBA.56  
However, section 301 preempted the state-law claims in other cases.57 
Section 301 preemption prevailed for the following reasons: 1) the extent of 
the duties allegedly breached by the NFL—by virtue of being the NFL 
player’s employer—required an analysis and interpretation of the CBA;58 2) 
because a sports league does not owe a common-law duty to protect players 
from mistreatment by individual teams, the extent of the duties voluntarily 
assumed by the league required an analysis and interpretation of the CBA;59 
and 3) consultation of the CBA was required because the player failed to 
show that his injuries were sustained when a CBA was not in effect.60 An 
analysis of the cases in which section 301 did and did not preempt the claims 
follows below. 
A. Instances of No Preemption under Section 301  
1. Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC 
In Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, three former football 
players and their wives sued the Arizona Cardinals and alleged that the team 
owed the players a duty to maintain a safe working environment, a duty not 
to expose them to unreasonable risks of harm, and a duty to warn them about 
the existence of concealed dangers after they sustained multiple 
concussions.61 The court ruled that the Cardinals’ duties owed to the players 
did not arise out of the CBA and therefore could be evaluated without its 
interpretation.62  
The court determined that the players’ negligence claims existed 
independently of the CBA and derived from common law duties to maintain 
a safe working environment, to refrain from exposing the players to 
unreasonable risks of harm, and to warn the players about dangers that were 
not reasonably foreseeable.63 Despite the existence of a Joint Committee on 
Player Safety and Welfare established within the CBA, the court stated that 
																																								 																				
56.  Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 875–76 (8th Cir. 2009). 
57.  See cases cited infra notes 58–60.  
58.  Williams, 582 F.3d at 881. 
59.  Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *3–4 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2014). 
60.  Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *2–3 (N.D. 
Ill. May 11, 2012). 
61.  Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1024 (E.D. Mo. 2014). 
The players further alleged that the team “knew or should have known ‘for many years’ that the sort of 
brain trauma to which the Players were exposed can lead to neurological impairments, including Chronic 
Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE).” Id. 
62.  Id. at 1020.  
63.  Id. at 1027. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss3/5
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“[m]ere reference to part of a CBA is insufficient for preemption; the 
relevant inquiry is whether the resolution of the claim depends upon the 
meaning of the CBA.”64 
Green highlights an important aspect of section 301 preemption—
although a CBA may appear to define certain duties owed to an employee 
(thus invoking preemption), preemption may be precluded due to 
preexisting common law duties derived from an employer-employee 
relationship.65 Importantly, the court ruled that the CBA may not be used as 
a defense by the Cardinals to limit their duty of care.66 That is, a CBA may 
not limit a duty of care (and invoke section 301 preemption) that is already 
prescribed by common law.  
2. Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co. 
In Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., Cleveland Browns player 
LeCharles Bentley filed a complaint against the Browns alleging fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation.67 After relying on representations by the 
Browns that their training facility was world class, Bentley used the 
Browns’ training facility to receive physical therapy treatment and 
subsequently received a staph infection.68  
The court held that Bentley’s claims did not implicate the CBA and were 
not dependent upon an analysis of the CBA.69 The fact that “nothing in the 
CBA required Bentley to use the Cleveland Brown’s facility” proved to be 
central to the court’s reasoning.70 The court noted that Bentley was free to 
choose any rehabilitation facility in the country and that doing so would not 
have contravened the CBA.71 
Bentley introduces an important aspect to section 301 preemption: if a 
player is free to receive rehabilitation services at facilities unaffiliated with 
																																								 																				
64.  Id. at 1028. 
65.  Id. at 1029. According to the court, “the terms of the CBAs would not be part of the 
plaintiff’s claims, which derive from and can be adjudged in accordance with standards set forth in the 
Missouri common law.” Id. 
66.  Id. at 1030. Notably, the court determined that the players’ status as employees provided 
them with a right to rely on the Cardinals’ absence of a warning about the dangers of their profession, 
and that “[a]ny contractual terms that alter these common law rights would take the form of a defense 
and could not serve as the basis for removal.” Id. 
67.  Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 958 N.E.2d 585, 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011). 
68.  Id. at 587. Bentley alleged that the Browns’ head athletic trainer said the facility was a 
“‘world class facility’ with a strong track record for successfully rehabilitating other Cleveland Browns 
players.” Id. 
69.  Id. at 589. The court followed precedent established in Jurevicius v. Cleveland Browns 
Football Co., LLC, 958 N.E.2d 585 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011), in which Jurevicius filed suit against the 
Browns for fraud and negligent misrepresentation after also receiving a staph infection at the Browns’ 
training facility. 
70.  Id. at 590. 
71.  Id. 
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the team/league, then interpretation or analysis of the CBA is not required 
even when a player ultimately chooses to receive rehabilitation treatment 
from the team/league. 
3. Williams v. National Football League 
In Williams v. National Football League, the NFL suspended several 
players after they tested positive for a banned substance.72 The players’ 
union alleged a breach of contract under the LMRA by the NFL, a violation 
of the Minnesota Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act 
(DATWA), and a violation of the Minnesota Consumable Products Act.73  
DATWA afforded an opportunity for employees to explain a positive 
drug test and have it verified by a confirmatory test before an employer 
could impose discipline.74 DATWA specifically addressed CBAs, noting 
that it did not limit parties from agreeing to a drug testing program that met 
or exceeded the minimum standards set forth in DATWA.75 The NFL 
argued that section 301 preempted the players’ DATWA claim because the 
court would necessarily be required to “construe the terms” of the NFL’s 
policy banning the use of certain substances “in order to determine whether 
its protections for players ‘meets or exceeds’ DATWA’s protections.”76 
The court disagreed, explaining that if a CBA met or exceeded the 
protections set forth in DATWA, then an employee simply retains two 
possible claims—one for breach of contract under section 301 and one 
under DATWA.77 Thus, section 301 preemption did not apply.78 Williams 
is significant because it recognizes that separate state-law claims that clearly 
proscribe conduct by an employer may be litigated without section 301 
preemption. Further, even if a violation of a state-law claim (such as 
DATWA) also constitutes a breach of the CBA, section 301 does not 
preempt the state-law claim so long as the claim does not require CBA 
interpretation—instead, the employee may retain two separate causes of 
action.  
																																								 																				
72.  Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 863 (8th Cir. 2009). 
73.  Id.  
74.  Id. at 874–75. “DATWA governs drug and alcohol testing in the Minnesota workplace by 
imposing ‘minimum standards and requirements for employee protection’ with regard to an employer’s 
drug and alcohol testing policy . . . . DATWA also requires that an employer provide an employee, who 
tests positive for drug use, with ‘written notice of the right to explain the positive test’ . . . and the ability 
to ‘request a confirmatory retest of the original sample at the employee’s or job applicant’s own expense 
. . . .’” Id. at 874. 
75.  Id. at 875. 
76.  Id. 
77.  Id. at 875–76. 
78.  Id. at 876. 
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B. Instances of Preemption under Section 301 
1. Williams v. National Football League 
In Williams, the court found that claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 
negligence, and gross negligence were preempted by section 301.79 The 
players alleged that the NFL knew that a certain product contained the 
banned substance bumetanide and failed to disclose this fact to the players.80 
The players asserted that the NFL’s duty to disclose this information arose 
from their fiduciary duty as an employer under Minnesota law.81 However, 
the court found that “whether the NFL or the individual defendants owed 
the Players a duty to provide such a warning cannot be determined without 
examining the parties’ legal relationship and expectations as established by 
the CBA and the Policy.”82 
2. Dent v. National Football League 
In Dent v. National Football League, NFL players sued the NFL and 
asserted several claims relating to improper administration of pain 
medications including fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent 
hiring of medical personnel.83 The NFL argued that the fraud and negligence 
claims were preempted by section 301.84 The court found that no common 
law duty existed for a sports league to protect players from alleged 
mistreatment by individual teams85 and concluded that to determine the 
extent of the NFL’s negligence in failing to oversee the clubs’ medication 
abuse, “it would be essential to take into account the affirmative steps the 
NFL has taken to protect the health and safety of the players, including the 
administration of medicine.”86 Because the CBA contained the duties owed 
																																								 																				
79.  Id. at 881. 
80.  Id.  
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2014). The pain medications included “opioids, Toradol, and other non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory medications, local anesthetics, and combinations thereof—all in an effort to return players 
to the game, rather than allow them to rest and heal properly from serious, football-related injuries.” Id. 
The other claims asserted included declaratory relief, medical monitoring, fraudulent concealment, 
negligence per se in relation to several federal and state laws, loss of consortium, and negligent retention 
of medical personnel. Id.  
84.  Id. at *2.  
85.  Id. “There is simply no case law that has imposed upon a sports league a common law duty 
to police the health-and-safety treatment of players by the clubs.” Id. at *3. 
86.  Id. at *7. 
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to its players and the affirmative steps the NFL undertook, section 301 
preempted the common law negligence claims.87  
3. Duerson v. National Football League, Inc. 
In Duerson v. National Football League, Inc., David Duerson committed 
suicide after sustaining multiple concussions during his NFL career.88 The 
complaint alleged that the NFL failed to educate Duerson about the risks of 
sustaining concussions and continuing to play football after sustaining 
concussions.89 Although the NFL contended that the estate’s claims were 
dependent upon analysis of two of its CBAs,90 the estate asserted that neither 
CBA was relevant because its allegations referenced a time period in which 
neither CBA was in effect.91 
The court recognized that the complaint used the words “throughout his 
career”92 and referred to other concussive episodes that occurred at 
unspecified times; therefore, the estate could not prove that CTE resulted 
from concussions sustained only when the CBAs were not in effect.93 
The court then turned to whether the CBAs had to be interpreted to 
resolve the estate’s claims.94 The NFL identified several provisions within 
its CBA that outlined the NFL’s duty, including a provision that required an 
NFL club’s physician to advise the player of health problems and a 
provision that required clubs to have a board-certified orthopedic surgeon 
as a club physician.95 
The court concluded because these provisions might “impose a duty on 
the NFL’s clubs to monitor a player’s health and fitness to continue to play 
																																								 																				
87.  Id. “The NFL addressed the problem of adequate medical care for players in at least one 
important and effective way, i.e., through a bargaining process that imposed uniform duties on all 
clubs—without diminution at the whim of individual state tort laws.” Id. 
88.  Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2012). Duerson allegedly “‘sustained at least three (3) documented concussive brain traumas, 
in 1988, 1990 and 1992, as well as numerous undocumented concussive brain traumas,’” and “played 
through the concussions because he was unaware that doing so could cause any harm.” Id. at *1.  
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. at *2. The NFL referred to the 1982 CBA, which was in effect until 1986, and the 1993 
CBA, which was in effect until 2000. 
91.  Id. Specifically, Duerson alleged that his complaint’s allegations related “only to 1987 
through 1993, years during which the CBAs were not in effect.” Id. 
92.  Id. Duerson’s complaint alleged that “‘[t]he NFL failed to prevent, diagnose, and/or properly 
treat DAVE DUERSON’s concussive brain traumas in 1988, 1990 and 1992 throughout his career.’” Id. 
93.  Id. The court stated that “it would be exceedingly implausible to contend that CTE was 
caused only by trauma suffered from 1987 through early 1993, and not by trauma from 1983 to 1986 or 
later in 1993. Any attempt to exclude head trauma suffered on certain dates from the claim would thus 
likely fail. Accordingly, the CBAs were in effect during at least some of the events alleged in the 
complaint.” Id. at *3. 
94.  Id.  
95.  Id. at *4.  
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football,”96 the CBA provisions would require interpretation. Although the 
court agreed with the estate that a duty to keep NFL players reasonably safe 
may have arisen apart from the CBA, section 301 still preempted the estate’s 
claim because the CBA required interpretation to determine the exact 
standard of care the NFL undertook.97  
In contrast, the court noted that if the scope of a league’s duty of care, 
such as that in Brown v. National Football League, is based upon rules and 
manuals that are not contained within a CBA, then section 301 might not 
preempt the plaintiff’s claim.98 
IV. ANALYZING WHY SECTION 301 PREEMPTED THE ESTATE’S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS IN BOOGAARD  
Although the court in Boogaard found that section 301 preempted all of 
the Estate’s claims, similar claims of negligence against the NHL alleged 
by a class of former NHL players in Concussion Injury survived section 301 
preemption at the motion to dismiss stage.99 A comprehensive analysis of 
Boogaard and how its outcome differed from the aforementioned NFL cases 
follows below. Then, an in-depth analysis will examine why the courts 
reached different conclusions on the negligence claims in Boogaard and 
Concussion Injury. 
Boogaard’s Estate first brought a claim against the National Hockey 
League Players’ Association (NHLPA) for failing to file a grievance with 
the New York Rangers on the Estate’s behalf after the Rangers refused to 
pay out the remainder of Boogaard’s contract.100 The NHLPA, as stipulated 
by the CBA, had only sixty days to file a grievance with the Rangers.101 
After the NHLPA advised the Estate that it would not be filing a grievance 
on its behalf, the Estate then had just six months to bring a claim against the 
NHLPA for a breach of their duty of fair representation.102 When the Estate 
																																								 																				
96.  Id.  
97.  Id. “But preemption is still possible even if the duty on which the claim is based arises 
independently of the CBA, so long as resolution of the claim requires interpretation of the CBA.” Id. 
98.  Id. at *5. In Brown v. National Football League, 219 F.Supp.2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), “the 
court held that a claim against the NFL for negligently overseeing a referee who threw a penalty flag 
into the plaintiff’s eye was not preempted” because the scope of the NFL’s duty was contained in rules 
and manuals, which were not contained within the CBA. Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353 at *5. 
99.  In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856, 880 (D. 
Minn. 2016). 
100.  See Boogard [sic] v. Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n, No. 2:12-cv-9128-ODW(FFM), 
2013 WL 1164301, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2013). Three seasons remained on Boogaard’s four-year 
contract with the New York Rangers. 
101.  Id. at *1. 
102.  Id. at *2. The NHLPA opted not to file a grievance after they learned that the treatment 
facility used by Boogaard refused to disclose Boogaard’s medical records without a court order. Id. A 
lawyer for the NHLPA advised Boogaard that the “NHL was freezing them out and that [the] NHLPA 
would have to take legal action against the doctor refusing to produce Boogaard’s medical records.” Id.  
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brought this claim against the NHLPA, the court dismissed it because the 
six-month statute of limitations had already run.103 The Estate then filed 
state-law negligence claims against the NHL, which are explained in detail 
below.104 
A. Boogaard v. National Hockey League 
Boogaard’s Estate originally filed suit against the NHL in 2014.105 The 
court found that the Illinois tort claims against the NHL for negligently 
failing to monitor and cure Boogaard’s pain medication addiction while 
Boogaard was enrolled in the SABH Program were completely preempted 
by section 301 because the CBA incorporated the SABH Program.106 Even 
after the case was removed to federal court and Minnesota state-law claims 
were added, the court in Boogaard still found that section 301 completely 
preempted the Estate’s remaining claims.107 Further, the court granted 
summary judgment to the NHL because even if the court analyzed the 
Estate’s claims as section 301 breach of contract claims under the LMRA, 
the statute of limitations had already run.108 As a result, section 301 
preemption left the Estate without any recourse or relief on its original 
negligence claims. 
The court utilized section 301 preemption analysis109 and reiterated that 
the Estate’s tort claims would only be preempted if they required CBA 
interpretation.110 The Estate, like the plaintiffs in the NFL cases, argued that 
its claims—aside from Counts III and IV, which were already preempted by 
section 301—did not require any interpretation of the CBA.111 
1. Counts V through VIII 
Counts V through VIII alleged that the NHL voluntarily assumed a duty 
to “keep [players] reasonably safe.”112 The court quickly concluded that 
Counts V through VIII were preempted by section 301.113 The court 
																																								 																				
103.  Id. at *5. The NHLPA advised Boogaard’s Estate on December 2, 2011 that it would not be 
filing the grievance. Boogaard’s Estate filed the claim against the NHLPA on September 21, 2012.  
104.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
105.  Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F. Supp. 3d 650 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
106.  Id. at 655, 657. 
107.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1014.  
108.  Id. 
109.  See supra, Part II discussion.  
110.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1017. The court quoted Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 
U.S. 202, 213 (1985), in asserting that a state-law claim will be preempted if it is “inextricably 
intertwined with consideration of the terms of [a] labor contract.” Id. 
111.  Id. at 1018.  
112.  Id. at 1019 (alteration in original).  
113.  Id. at 1018. 
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reasoned that because “[s]tate tort law generally does not impose any duty 
to act to protect others from harm,” the CBA would need to be interpreted 
to determine the duties and their scope that the NHL voluntarily assumed to 
protect Boogaard’s health.114  
To support the conclusion that the NHL voluntarily assumed a duty to 
keep Boogaard reasonably safe, the Estate referenced actions taken by the 
NHL that, on the surface, do not appear to require any interpretation of the 
CBA.115 For instance, the NHL penalized high sticking, kicking, tripping, 
and required helmets to be worn.116 However, the court distinguished 
between voluntarily assuming a duty to keep players reasonably safe and 
voluntarily assuming a duty to protect players from specific harms.117 It 
reasoned that because the CBA “exhaustively detail[ed] each party’s 
specific obligations to the others,” it required interpretation to determine the 
scope of the duties the NHL assumed.118 
The Estate also argued that the NHL was negligent for failing to institute 
a “‘bench concussion assessment protocol’ and for allowing players to 
return after a concussion without first being cleared by an independent 
doctor as well as a team doctor.”119 The NHL countered that because the 
CBA gave it no power over individual team doctors and the medical 
standards they used, it did not assume general duties to keep players 
reasonably safe and prevent brain trauma.120 The court agreed, noting that 
“it is unlikely that the NHL would have assumed responsibility for ‘keeping 
players reasonably safe’ and ‘preventing brain trauma’ while 
simultaneously adopting a [CBA] that prohibited them from taking steps 
necessary to meet those responsibilities.”121 
																																								 																				
114.  Id. The court explained that “Illinois and Minnesota law recognize an exception to the 
general rule, called the voluntary undertaking doctrine, which provides that ‘liability can arise from the 
negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking.’ . . . Simply stated, the doctrine provides that if a 
person sets out to help someone, she assumes a duty to do so reasonably.” Id. (quoting Pippin v. Chi 
Housing Auth., 399 N.E.2d 596, 599 (1979)). 
115.  Id.  
116.  Id. at 1019. Specifically, the NHL penalized high sticking in 1929, kicking in 1932, tripping 
in 1934, prohibited players on the bench from joining a fight in 1959, prohibited body contact during 
face-offs in 1964, and required helmets to be worn in 1979. Id. 
117.  Id. “Such an inquiry would entail considering all of the NHL’s relevant acts to determine 
whether it undertook to ‘keep [players] reasonably safe during their NHL careers,’ as Boogaard 
contends, or whether it undertook only to protect players from more specific harms, such as high 
sticking, kicking, and tripping.” Id. (alteration in original). 
118.  Id. “Thus, the specific acts by the NHL that Boogaard insists represent a broader and more 
generalized commitment to protect players from harm must be interpreted in context with the hyper-
specific commitments that the NHL made in the CBA itself.” Id. 
119.     Id.   
120.  Id. at 1020. Article 16.11(e) of the CBA required the team doctor to “certify that a player 
was eligible for Injured Reserve. That could plausibly be taken to provide that teams were free to develop 
their own ‘medical standards’ for diagnosing injuries, including concussions, without the NHL’s 
interference.” Id. (citation omitted).  
121.     Id.  
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The Estate then argued that the NHL should have altered the rules on 
fighting to further protect its players. But the NHL again countered by 
asserting that the CBA precluded the NHL from changing the rules 
unilaterally without consent from the NHLPA.122 The court again agreed, 
noting that the NHL’s voluntarily assumed duties did not include an 
obligation to alter the playing rules to make the game safer.123 Therefore, 
the court concluded that Counts V and VI were completely preempted by 
section 301 because the CBA required interpretation to ascertain the scope 
of the NHL’s voluntarily assumed duties.124 The court likewise concluded 
that Counts VII and VIII were completely preempted by section 301 
because the NHL plausibly asserted that the CBA prevented it from 
prohibiting team doctors to administer Toradol.125 Therefore, the court ruled 
that Counts V through VIII were preempted by section 301.126 
2. Counts I and II  
Ordinarily, it is a general rule that one is under no duty to act to protect 
another from harm.127 While counts V through VIII alleged that the NHL 
voluntarily assumed a duty to protect Boogaard, Counts I and II alleged that 
the NHL “owed a duty to [Boogaard] to keep him reasonably safe during 
his NHL career and to refrain from causing an addiction to controlled 
substances.”128 Because the Estate did not allege that the NHL voluntarily 
assumed this duty, the court sought to find how the NHL might be charged 
																																								 																				
122.  Id. Article 30.3 of the CBA provides: “The NHL and its Clubs shall not . . . amend or modify 
the provisions (or portions thereof) of the League Rules or any of the League’s Playing Rules in existence 
on the date of this Agreement which affect terms or conditions of employment of any Player, without 
the prior written consent of the NHLPA which shall not be unreasonably withheld.” Id. 
123.  Id. “And if Article 30.3 meant that the NHL could not have more severely punished fighting 
without first haggling with the NHLPA, then it is unlikely that the NHL’s voluntarily assumed duties 
included an obligation to change the rules of play to make the game safer by not changing the rules of 
play to further discourage fighting.” Id. 
124.  Id. at 1021. The Prescription Medication Program, incorporated in the CBA, “extensively 
regulat[ed] when and how team doctors and trainers could administer prescription medications” and 
“explicitly prohibited team doctors from prescribing or otherwise dispensing drugs ‘merely to enhance 
[an employee’s] performance or to reduce fatigue.’ . . . The Prescription Medication Program, together 
with Article 30.3’s prohibition on unilateral amendments to important league rules, arguably implies 
that the NHL otherwise lacked the authority to direct how teams administered and tracked medications. 
That in turn arguably suggests that the NHL’s voluntarily assumed duties did not include prohibiting 
team doctors from administering Toradol.” Id. (alteration in original). 
125.  Id.  
126.  Id. at 1022. “Whether the NHL owed Boogaard a duty to take steps that Counts V through 
VIII fault it for failing to take depends largely on genuinely contested interpretations of the CBA. Those 
claims therefore are completely preempted.” Id. 
127.  Id. at 1022–23.  
128.  Id. at 1022 (alteration in original). 
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with upholding this duty to protect Boogaard under the special relationship 
doctrine.129  
Under the special relationship doctrine, the NHL might have had a duty 
to protect Boogaard because of the custodian-protectee exception.130 
Whether the NHL qualified as a custodian and Boogaard as a protectee 
depended on the NHL’s “ability to control [Boogaard’s] behavior and 
circumstances.”131 The court noted that because both the NHL and the Estate 
disputed the amount of control the CBA afforded the NHL over Boogaard, 
it would be necessary to interpret the CBA to “determine whether the NHL 
actually had a duty to protect Boogaard from addiction.”132 As a result, the 
court concluded that Counts I and II were also completely preempted by 
section 301.133  
B. How Boogaard Differs from the NFL Cases 
The NFL cases discussed in Part IV offer further explanation of why the 
court preempted the Estate’s claims, as the court in Boogaard referenced 
and distinguished several of these cases. For instance, the court suggested 
that an employer-employee relationship did not exist in Boogaard134 and no 
state law imposed a duty on the NHL to protect Boogaard.135 While the court 
did not reference all of the NFL cases, their outcomes may explain some of 
the court’s reasoning, which is discussed in greater detail below. 
Unlike Green v. Arizona Football Club LLC, the NHL’s duties did not 
arise out of an employer-employee relationship and instead arose out of a 
CBA.136 Because individual NHL teams (and not the NHL itself) employs 
																																								 																				
129.  Id. at 1023. Under the special relationship doctrine, “a private person has no duty to act 
affirmatively to protect another from criminal attack by a third person absent a ‘special relationship’ 
between the parties . . . . Historically, there have been four ‘special relationships’ which [the courts] 
have recognized, namely, common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, business invitor-invitee, and 
voluntary custodian-protectee.” Id. (alteration in original). 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. at 1022. “The parties dispute the amount of control that the NHL had over Boogaard’s 
welfare, and the focus of their dispute is on the terms of the 2005 CBA, so to decide whether the NHL 
was Boogaard’s custodian, the court would have to interpret the CBA.” Id. at 1023 (citation omitted). 
For instance, the court noted that the CBA included the Prescription Medication Program which, along 
with Article 30.3, “arguably could be read to divest the NHL of the authority to control players’ medical 
treatment.” Id. 
133.  Id. at 1024. “Accordingly, whether the NHL was Boogaard’s custodian for purposes of 
Counts I and II depends largely on genuinely contested interpretations of the CBA, which means that 
those counts are completely preempted.” Id. 
134.  See infra note 136. 
135.  See infra note 139. 
136.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1024 (explaining that unlike Green, there is a question in 
Boogaard regarding whether the NHL is Boogaard’s employer—therefore, the CBA must be interpreted 
to specify the duties owed by the NHL to Boogaard); Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 
21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1028 (E.D. Mo. 2014). 
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players, an employer-employee relationship between the NHL and 
Boogaard likely did not exist.137 Although a special relationship between 
the NHL and Boogaard may exist under a custodian-protectee relationship, 
the court concluded that CBA interpretation would be required to determine 
whether this special relationship existed.138  
In Bentley v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., section 301 preemption 
did not apply because state law imposed a duty—independent of the CBA—
on the NFL team not to misrepresent the quality of the training facility 
where Bentley was treated.139 Unlike Bentley, the NHL’s SABH Program 
mandated Boogaard’s treatment.140 The court in Boogaard did not analyze 
this mandated requirement in the context of Bentley. However, its silence 
on the issue suggests that the SABH’s presence in the CBA—coupled with 
the absence of Illinois or Minnesota state law that would impose a similar 
duty (as noted in Bentley) on NHL teams or doctors independent of the 
CBA—also differentiates Boogaard from Bentley. 
In Williams v. National Football League, the players argued that the NFL 
violated a state statute (DATWA) that imposed duties on the NFL 
independent of the CBA.141 In effect, the claims that directly related to the 
breach of those duties outlined in the statute were not preempted by section 
301.142 In contrast, Boogaard’s Estate did not allege any violation of a state 
statute that identified duties separate and distinct from those in the CBA, 
and therefore the court did not address Williams.  
In Dent v. National Football League, the players alleged that the NFL 
improperly managed the administration of pain medications, including 
Toradol.143 Similarly, Boogaard’s Estate alleged in Counts VII and VIII that 
																																								 																				
137.  Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey League and National Hockey 
League Players’ Association, EXHIBIT 1 (July 22, 2005), http://www.letsgopens.com/NHL-2005-
CBA.pdf [hereinafter “2005 CBA”]; Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Hockey 
League and National Hockey League Players’ Association, September 16, 2012 – September 15, 2022, 
EXHIBIT 1 (Feb. 15, 2013), http://cdn.agilitycms.com/nhlpacom/PDF/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf 
[hereinafter “2012 CBA”]. 
138.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1023. Absent a special relationship, a party has no common 
law duty to protect others from harm. Id. (citing Iseberg v. Gross, 879 N.E.2d 278, 284 (Ill. 2007)). 
Because the existence of a custodial relationship depends on the amount of control the custodian (NHL) 
maintains over the protectee (Boogaard), the court concluded that the CBA would need to be interpreted. 
Id. 
139.  Id. at 1024. “As the court reasoned, there was no need to interpret the [CBA] to determine 
whether the team had a duty not to tell deliberate and material falsehoods because . . . Ohio law imposed 
that particular duty on everyone, independent of any [CBA].” Id. 
140.  See Romero, supra note 19, at 286. See also 2005 CBA, supra note 137, at Art. 47.3 (“All 
other forms of "substance abuse" and behavioral and domestic issues requiring employee assistance will 
continue to be handled through the NHL/NHLPA Program for Substance Abuse and Behavioral Health 
(the "SABH Program").”). 
141.  Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2009).  
142.  Id. at 876.  
143.  Dent v. Nat’l Football League, No. C 14-02324 WHA, 2014 WL 7205048 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 17, 2014). 
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the NHL negligently failed to prevent team doctors from injecting Boogaard 
with Toradol.144 While the court in Boogaard did not address Dent, the Dent 
court asserted that “no decision in any state . . . has ever held that a 
professional sports league owed such a duty to intervene and stop 
mistreatment by the league’s independent clubs.”145 Therefore, like the NFL 
in Dent, the NHL is likely not bound by a separate duty independent of the 
CBA to protect Boogaard. Instead, the Boogaard court found that because 
the CBA established the right to medical care for Boogaard, it would need 
to be interpreted to resolve the claims.146 
Finally, in Duerson v. National Football League, Inc., the player’s estate 
argued that the NFL violated a duty—separate and independent of the 
CBA—to keep Duerson reasonably safe.147 While the court agreed that this 
duty may have been imposed on the NFL, section 301 still preempted the 
claim because the CBA would need to be interpreted to identify the actual 
standard of care undertaken by the NFL.148 Importantly, the Duerson court 
referenced a separate case (Brown v. National Football League) in which 
section 301 did not preempt the claim because the scope of the NFL’s duty 
of care was defined by reference to rules and manuals that were not 
contained within the CBA.149  
Like Duerson, Boogaard’s Estate also argued that the NHL violated a 
duty to keep Boogaard reasonably safe.150 Although the court in Boogaard 
did not directly address Duerson, it referenced and distinguished Brown v. 
National Football League, which did not allege the violation of a voluntarily 
assumed duty by the NFL to keep Brown safe.151 Instead, Brown asserted 
that the NFL violated a duty not to unreasonably harm him.152 Brown might 
																																								 																				
144.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1016.  
145.  Dent, 2014 WL 7205048 at *3.  
146.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1021. The court determined that because the CBA incorporated 
the Prescription Medication Program—which the NHL asserted prevented it from “interfering with 
medical decisions regarding players”—the NHL therefore plausibly argued that its “voluntarily assumed 
duties did not include prohibiting team doctors from administering Toradol.” Id. As a result, the court 
concluded that “ascertaining the scope of the NHL’s voluntarily assumed duties would require 
interpreting the CBA” and therefore resulted in section 301 preemption. Id. 
147.  Duerson v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., No. 12 C 2513, 2012 WL 1658353 at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
May 11, 2012). 
148.  Id. As the court in Duerson explained, “[s]howing that a duty raised in a state-law tort claim 
originates in a CBA is certainly sufficient to require preemption.” Id. However, “[o]ther provisions in 
the CBAs also address player health and safety, and may be interpreted to impose a general duty on the 
NFL clubs to diagnose and treat ongoing conditions like the concussive trauma that led to Duerson’s 
CTE.” Id. 
149.  Id. at *5 (referencing Brown v. Nat’l Football League, 219 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002)).  
150.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. 
151.  Id. at 1025. “None of the cited cases involved claims, like Boogaard’s, alleging a breach of 
a voluntarily assumed duty (Counts III through VIII) or a free-floating duty to act (Counts I and II) in a 
manner that would require interpretation of a [CBA].” Id.  
152.  Id. at 1025. 
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also be influential because rules and manuals helped define the scope of the 
NFL’s duty, and those rules and manuals were not contained within the 
CBA.153  
Like Brown and the NFL, the NHL’s CBA does not include the rules of 
play.154 However, the NHL asserted that a clause in the CBA specifically 
prevents it from altering the rules of play without consent from the NHLPA, 
and the court in Boogaard concluded that CBA interpretation would 
therefore be required to “ascertain[] the scope of the NHL’s voluntarily 
assumed duties.”155 Because the NHL’s CBA is very specific and detailed, 
it is more likely that the CBA will either define the scope of any duty that 
the NHL assumes or at least provide an argument by the NHL that it defines 
the scope of a duty.156  
As evidenced, the NFL cases cited differ from Boogaard in many 
respects, and they provide insight as to why the court concluded that section 
301 preempted all of the Estate’s claims. However, a case that also asserted 
negligence claims against the NHL reached a different outcome than 
Boogaard at the motion to dismiss stage.157 An analysis of that case is 
presented below. 
C. In re National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation 
In Concussion Injury, a class of former NHL players brought suit against 
the NHL for breaching its duty of reasonable care for player safety.158 The 
players alleged that the NHL knew or should have known of evidence 
linking brain trauma to long-term neurological problems and that the NHL 
failed to protect the players and inform them of such dangers.159 To support 
their contention, the players alleged that the NHL assumed this duty to 
																																								 																				
153.  Duerson, 2012 WL 1658353, at *5. 
154.  See 2012 CBA, supra note 137; Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. 
155.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1021. The clause, Article 30.3 of the CBA, states: “The NHL 
and its Clubs shall not . . . amend or modify the provisions (or portions thereof) of the League Rules or 
any of the League's Playing Rules in existence on the date of this Agreement which affect terms or 
conditions of employment of any Player, without the prior written consent of the NHLPA which shall 
not be unreasonably withheld.” Id. at 1020. 
156.  Id. See infra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
157.  In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 189 F. Supp. 3d 856, 882 (D. 
Minn. 2016). 
158.  Id. at 860–61. Six named plaintiffs sought to represent retired NHL players: Dan LaCouture, 
Michael Peluso, Gary Leeman, Bernie Nicholls, David Christian, and Reed Larson sought “to represent 
Class 1: All living Retired NHL Hockey Players who have not been diagnosed with dementia, ALS, 
Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, CTE, or other neurodegenerative disease or conditions (collectively, ‘Brain 
Disease’).” Id. at 860. Class 2 included “[a]ll living and deceased Retired NHL Hockey Players who 
have been diagnosed with a Brain Disease, and their Representative Claimants and Derivative 
Claimants, where such Brain Disease was not diagnosed at the time the player retired or otherwise 
permanently ceased playing professional hockey.” Id.  
159.  Id.  
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protect players against head-trauma “by virtue of instituting a helmet 
requirement in 1979 and creating a Concussion Program in 1997 to research 
and study brain injuries in players.”160 The court denied the NHL’s motion 
to dismiss, noting that section 301 preemption did not apply (yet) at this 
stage of the proceedings.161 
The similarities between Boogaard and Concussion Injury are apparent: 
both alleged that the NHL breached its duty to keep players reasonably safe. 
Yet one case resulted in the invocation of section 301 while the other did 
not. Count III in Concussion Injury alleged that the NHL was negligent in 
ensuring the safety of NHL players.162 Likewise, Boogaard’s Estate alleged 
that the NHL breached its duty to keep Boogaard reasonably safe.163 Like 
Boogaard, the NHL in Concussion Injury argued that if a duty to keep the 
class of NHL players reasonably safe existed at all, then the CBA created 
that duty.164 
The NHL contended that “the helmet requirement was implemented 
pursuant to a CBA between the NHL and the Player’s Union and [was] thus 
‘necessarily’ based on a CBA.”165 As for the Concussion Program, the NHL 
asserted that because it implemented the program via an agreement with the 
NHLPA, it was therefore based on the CBA.166 The court disregarded these 
arguments167 because the players’ complaint did not reference any CBA and 
the NHL did “not cite to any CBA provisions that purportedly imposed a 
duty upon which Plaintiffs’ claims are based.”168  
																																								 																				
160.  Id. at 861. The players also alleged that the NHL caused injuries and increased the risk of 
injury to the players by “refusing to cease its glorification of fist-fighting and violence in the NHL.” Id. 
161.  Id. at 882. 
162.  Id. at 861–62. “Plaintiffs allege that the NHL has ‘historically and voluntarily assumed an 
independent tort duty of reasonable care regarding player safety and head trauma’; has assumed a duty 
to ‘manage player safety, particularly with regard to head injuries and concussions’; and has ‘a duty of 
reasonable care to act in the best interests of the health and safety of NHL players[,] to provide truthful 
information to NHL players regarding risks to their health[,] and to take all reasonable steps necessary 
to ensure the safety of players.’” Id. (alteration in original). 
163.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1022–23 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
164.  Concussion Injury, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 868. “Defendant argues that Count III is preempted, 
first, because these alleged duties arose, if at all, under the CBAs entered into on their behalf by the 
Players’ Union, and, second, because an evaluation of the existence and extent of those duties would 
require interpretation of the terms of the CBAs.” Id. 
165.  Id.  
166.  Id.  
167.  Id. at 869. “[T]he Court cannot find from the face of the Amended Complaint, or any 
documents properly embraced by the pleadings, that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims are preempted on the 
grounds that the allegedly breached duties arose out of a CBA.” Id. 
168.  Id. The NHL relied on documents other than the CBA in contending that a duty to keep the 
players reasonably safe, if it existed at all, arose from the CBA. For instance, the NHL relied “on 
numerous other documents—meeting minutes, letters, memoranda, and reports dated between 1979 and 
2013. But, these documents constitute cherry-picked evidence . . . .” Id. Because these documents were 
outside the pleadings, the court concluded that it could “not rely on them as a basis for dismissing 
Plaintiffs’ claims at this stage of the proceedings.” Id. 
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The court also noted that because many of the plaintiff NHL players were 
retired, it was unclear which CBAs might apply to them; in effect, more 
discovery would be required.169 Importantly, the court noted the players’ 
efforts to show that the NHL’s duty to protect them did not arise from the 
CBA.170 The players acknowledged that while the NHL referenced CBA 
provisions regarding player health, safety, rules, and discipline, sources 
outside of the CBA evidenced an independent duty assumed by the NHL to 
keep the players reasonably safe.171 For instance, the players referenced a 
presentation made to the NHL Board of Governors by the NHL Department 
of Player Safety which stated that “‘[t]he NHL has always assumed the 
responsibility of making the game safer through rule changes, medical 
treatment policies, equipment analysis, enhancements to the playing 
environment, and supplemental discipline.’”172 
Given that neither the pleadings nor the documents referenced by the 
players referenced a CBA, the court could not determine at this stage in the 
proceedings that interpretation of the CBA would be required to resolve the 
claims.173 The court reasoned that:  
[T]he mere fact that a CBA creates rights or duties similar to those 
on which a state-law claim is based, or that the parties involved in the 
dispute are subject to a CBA, or that the event giving rise to the 
dispute may be subject to a CBA’s grievance procedures, is not 
sufficient to trigger preemption.174 
The court also analyzed and distinguished Boogaard. Although the 
duties the Estate alleged the NHL violated in Boogaard “had relevant and 
direct counterparts in the CBA—i.e., the duty to prevent painkiller addiction 
																																								 																				
169.  Id. at 870. The court differentiated Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck and United Steelworkers 
of Am. v. Rawson, noting that in those cases the Supreme Court ruled that section 301 preemption applied 
to the plaintiffs’ claims after full discovery ensued. Id. at 869. In contrast, the current case “seeks 
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims based solely on the Amended Complaint and a handful of 
cherry-picked documents that are not embraced by the pleadings. This record is insufficient to form the 
basis of the court’s opinion on this matter.” Id. at 872. The court further noted that the plaintiff in the 
two cases specifically alleged that the defendants negligently performed a provision of the relevant CBA, 
whereas in the current case the plaintiffs did not reference the CBA at all. Id.  
170.  Id. at 876. 
171.  Id. at 874–76. The players, for example, asserted that health and safety provisions in the 
CBA were only tangentially related to their claims and did not eradicate an independently assumed duty 
by the NHL to inform them of other dangers. Id. at 868. 
172.  Id. at 874 (alteration in original). The players also referenced a Concussion Program 
document that described the NHL’s formation of the Concussion Committee, a letter from the NHL to 
the NHLPA in which the NHL asserted that it was not required to negotiate with the NHLPA to institute 
a helmet requirement, and an e-mail from the NHL Deputy Commissioner (Bill Daly) to the NHLPA 
asserting that the NHL could enact rule changes without NHLPA approval. Id. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. at 875. 
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versus the CBA’s Prescription Medication Program,”175 the players in 
Concussion Injury alleged that the NHL breached a duty that “runs straight 
from Defendant to the players.”176 Therefore, the claims did not 
(preliminarily) require CBA interpretation.177 
D. Result of Boogaard: a Different Kind of Boogeyman 
Although the Boogaard court concluded that section 301 preempted all 
of the Estate’s claims, the case did not end there.178 The court then attempted 
to analyze the preempted claims under the LMRA and section 301 as a 
breach of the CBA.179 The CBA provided that the NHLPA must either first 
bring suit on the Estate’s behalf or notify the Estate that it would not bring 
suit180—only then may the Estate bring its own claim against both the NHL 
for breach of the CBA and perhaps against the NHLPA for a breach of its 
duty of fair representation (this type of suit is called a hybrid contract/duty-
of-fair representation claim).181 
Because the CBA required arbitration to resolve a dispute concerning 
issues that involve the CBA, the Estate’s claims could only survive as a 
hybrid claim.182 Unfortunately for the Estate, a six-month statute of 
limitations—which began when the Estate learned that the NHLPA would 
not file a grievance on its behalf—applies to hybrid claims.183 In addition to 
the six-month statute of limitations, the CBA itself mandated that the 
NHLPA must file a grievance on behalf of the player within sixty days of 
learning facts that gave rise to the claim.184 The statute of limitations would 
have therefore barred the Estate’s claims against the NHL eight months after 
Boogaard’s death.185 Because the Estate did not initiate claims against the 
																																								 																				
175.  Id. at 878.  
176.  Id. at 879. 
177.  Id. In Concussion Injury, the claims were much broader, indicating a breach of the duty of 
reasonable care to “act in the best interests of the health and safety of NHL players by providing truthful 
information to the players regarding the neurological risks of head injuries suffered while playing hockey 
in the NHL.” Id. at 878–79. 
178.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The court 
noted that “[c]ompletely preempted claims are not automatically dismissed, but rather generally are 
treated as if they alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement in violation of § 301.” Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. “However, if the union either decides not to pursue a grievance or pursues a grievance 
and loses, the employee may bring suit in federal court alleging both that the union breached its duty of 
fair representation and that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement, in what is called 
a ‘hybrid contract/duty-of-fair representation claim.’” Id.  
182.  Id. at 1026. 
183.  Id. The six-month statute of limitations may also begin once the arbitrator rules in favor of 
the NHL if the NHLPA did indeed choose to file a grievance.  
184.  Id. at 1027.  
185.  Id.  
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NHL until almost two years after Boogaard’s death, the statute of limitations 
precludes the Estate from initiating section 301 claims against the NHL.186 
After the ruling in Boogaard, the Estate filed an amended complaint with 
additional claims that it argued were not preempted by section 301.187 
Because the statute of limitations on state-law tort claims has not yet run, 
the Estate may file amended complaints which allege different causes of 
action that do not require interpretation of the CBA. Therefore, while the 
Estate is precluded from receiving relief on section 301 claims and on its 
original negligence claims that were preempted by section 301, it may 
prevail in asserting that the NHL violated or breached duties that are not 
dependent upon interpretation of the CBA.188 On June 5, 2017, the court 
dismissed the Estate’s remaining claims with prejudice, in part due to the 
Estate’s failure to show that the NHL owed Boogaard any legal duties.189 
V. PROPOSAL TO CHANGE SECTION 301 AND STRATEGIES TO 
CIRCUMVENT SECTION 301 PREEMPTION IN FUTURE LITIGATION 
A. Proposal to Change Section 301 Statute of Limitations 
As the Boogaard case demonstrates, section 301 preemption may result 
in an ironic scheme in which the LMRA may not afford relief that the 
plaintiff could otherwise receive under a state-law tort claim.190 Because 
state-law tort claims are subject to a much longer statute of limitations 
																																								 																				
186.  Id. “There is no indication in the record that the NHLPA pursued a grievance related to these 
claims, and it is inconceivable that Boogaard’s representatives did not learn about the NHLPA’s decision 
not to pursue a grievance until nearly a year and a half after his death.” Id. 
187.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1107 (N.D. Ill. 2016). Boogaard’s 
amended complaint included twelve counts, eight of which were ruled to be preempted by section 301 
because they were “essentially identical to the first amended complaint’s eight counts.” Id. at 1111. The 
court ruled that the first four counts, however, were not preempted by section 301 because they alleged 
that the NHL “actively harmed Boogaard,” reasoning that “[e]very person has a duty not to act 
unreasonably in a way that injures others.” Id. 
188.  Id. For instance, the Estate’s amended complaint alleged that the NHL took active steps to 
promote violence in the NHL through promotions of documentaries, stories, network segments, and 
films that glorified fighting. The Estate also alleged that the NHL “actively and unreasonably harmed 
Boogaard by implicitly communicating that head trauma is not dangerous.” Id. at 1112.  
189.  Boogaard v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2017 WL 2424152 (N.D. Ill. June 5, 2017). 
190.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1027. If not for section 301 preemption, some of the Estate’s 
claims could have survived as state-law tort claims, in which case the statute of limitations would not 
have run. See id. at 1018–21 (explaining that Counts V through VIII alleged the violation of voluntarily 
assumed duties by NHL, which are cognizable under Illinois and Minnesota tort law); see also id. at 
1022–23 (explaining that Counts I and II alleged the violation of duty to protect Boogaard by NHL due 
to existence of special relationship with Boogaard—both Illinois and Minnesota tort law recognize the 
custodian-protectee special relationship); see also id. at 1027 (recognizing that the Estate brought suit 
against the NHL less than two years after Boogaard’s death); see infra note 191 (explaining that the 
statute of limitations in Illinois and Minnesota is two years for tort claims). Even if the state-law tort 
claims were also barred by the statute of limitations, Boogaard’s section 301 hybrid claims are subject 
to a much shorter statute of limitations period of six months. See infra note 191. 
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period than section 301 claims, the Estate could not receive relief on its 
original claims against the NHL.191 Ironically, the LMRA was designed—
in part—to produce the opposite effect. Congress passed the LMRA to: 
[P]romote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate 
rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting 
commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing 
the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to 
protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor 
organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and 
proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect 
commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the 
rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting 
commerce.192  
In Boogaard, the Estate must have filed suit against the NHL for a breach 
of the LMRA under section 301 within six months of receiving notification 
that the NHLPA did not file a grievance on its behalf.193 As explained above, 
many of the Estate’s claims simply alleged state-law tort claims against the 
NHL, which would have otherwise been subject to a two-year statute of 
limitations period.194 But because these claims were preempted by section 
301 and filed after the six-month statute of limitations period ran, the Estate 
could not prevail.195  
When parents learn that their child has died of an accidental drug 
overdose, the notion of complex litigation may not arise for months. Even 
after six months, families of deceased players are likely still grieving the 
loss of their loved ones, and the prospect of bringing suit may not 
materialize.196 Like the Estate, many families may spend months simply 
trying to seek answers.197 The original purposes of the NLRA and section 
																																								 																				
191.  The statute of limitations period for personal injuries in Illinois is two years. 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/13-202 (2016). The statute of limitations period for personal injuries in Minnesota is also two 
years. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07 (West 2016). 
192.  National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012) (emphasis added). 
193.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1025–26.  
194.  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
195.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1027. 
196.  Boogaard’s father learned about five months after Boogaard’s death that doctors diagnosed 
Boogaard with CTE after examining his brain. John Branch, Derek Boogaard: A Brain ‘Going Bad’, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-
brain-going-bad.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. “It was then that Len Boogaard stopped listening. 
Something occurred to him that he did not expect. For months, he could not bear the thought of his son’s 
death. Suddenly, he was forced to imagine the life his son might have been left to live.” Id. 
197.  Id. Boogaard’s father, a police officer, did not hear from the New York Rangers for several 
months after his son’s death. His father instead resorted to investigating his son’s relationships, phone 
records, and paper trails to “link the history of his son’s prescriptions to vague diagnoses in team medical 
reports.” Id.  
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301 are not being enhanced via a six-month statute of limitations on hybrid 
claims, which could otherwise be filed as common law negligence claims 
subject to a statute of limitations of two years or more.198 Instead of 
protecting and granting more power to individual employees, section 301—
through its preemptive effect—provides even more power to the 
employer.199 To be clear, the Estate’s claims of negligence against the NHL 
were subject to a six-month statute of limitations only because the CBA 
meticulously detailed the extent of the NHL’s voluntary duties to keep 
Boogaard safe and included an arbitration provision which required the 
NHLPA to act first on the Estate’s behalf.200 
One counterpoint to section 301’s negative preemptive effect is that it 
may encourage employers to draft more extensive and specific CBAs. In 
being more specific and detailed, employers may voluntarily assume 
particular duties of care, reduce ambiguities in disputes involving the CBA, 
and take a more active role in the welfare of their employees. On the other 
hand, common law negligence claims are more likely to be preempted by 
section 301 and transformed into claims for breach of contract.201 
Therefore, the NHL may argue that it assists players like Boogaard by 
assuming certain duties to protect, such as providing a medical treatment 
and rehabilitation program.202 But the notion that a breach of this duty 
should result in a shorter statute of limitations merely because the CBA 
outlines the scope of that duty is untenable. In passing section 301, Congress 
aimed to ensure that federal courts retain jurisdiction over CBAs and 
uniformly apply federal labor law instead of inconsistent local state laws.203 
																																								 																				
198.  See Labor Management Relations Act: What Was the Purpose of the Labor Management 
Relations Act?, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (June 1, 2012), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/lmrarequirements.aspx; see 
also Oakes, supra note 35. Purposes of passing the NLRA include providing employees more freedoms 
and rights, including the right to associate and self-organize. While the LMRA largely shifted the 
emphasis from protection of employee rights to enhanced restrictions on unions, section 301 was 
implemented to apply federal law consistently. 
199.  See 2012 CBA, supra note 137; Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1019. By drafting the CBA 
in a “hyper-specific” manner, the NHL essentially guaranteed that many negligence claims would be 
preempted by section 301 and therefore subject to a six-month statute of limitations. See also Romero, 
supra note 19, at 307 (“Because courts have broadly interpreted CBAs and their contractual nature, 
claims that would normally fall under tort law are deemed to be subject to arbitration.”).  
200.  Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1025–26 (explaining that under section 301 claims, because 
the CBA included an arbitration provision, Boogaard needed to wait until the NHLPA either filed suit 
on his behalf and lost or notified Boogaard that it would not file suit. Only then may Boogaard file suit 
against both the NHLPA and the NHL, which would be subject to a six-month statute of limitations 
period). 
201.  See Boogaard, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 1019.  
202.  See 2012 CBA, supra note 137. 
203.  See Oakes, supra note 35, at 206; see also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 
209 (1985) (noting that section 301 represented a “congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion 
a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising out of labor contracts”); see also 
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It is doubtful that a short six-month statute of limitations period was a chief 
concern among the framers of the LMRA in ensuring that courts 
consistently apply federal labor law. Congress can still ensure that courts 
consistently apply the law by simply extending the section 301 statute of 
limitations period to two years.204 
B. The Sixty-Day CBA Provision Should Be Prohibited 
Certain CBA provisions should be prohibited as void as against public 
policy. For instance, the NHL CBA provided that before the Estate could 
file a grievance/claim against the NHL, the NHLPA must first file a 
grievance on behalf of the Estate within sixty days.205 While this provision 
may be appropriate in circumstances relating directly to business operations 
(for instance, when a player disputes the method or amount of salary/bonus 
paid or if the player disputes a suspension levied against him), it hardly 
seems appropriate in cases of death. When a player dies, it is highly 
questionable that the deceased’s estate should be prohibited from filing a 
grievance/claim on behalf of the deceased until the NHLPA has done so 
first. Even though the NLRA was enacted to expand the rights of employees 
to collectively bargain, it allows for the inclusion of inequitable CBA 
provisions that unreasonably restrict not only the rights of employees, but 
the rights of the employees’ families to bring suit.206  
The NHL’s CBA provides more power to the players’ union at the 
expense of the individual employee. Because Congress passed the NLRA in 
part “to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which 
can harm the general welfare of workers,” it appears that the provision at 
issue directly counters Congress’s intent.207 The sixty-day statute of 
limitations also effectively means that unless the player or the player’s 
estate files suit in court within eight months of the event upon which the 
grievance is based, the claims that require CBA interpretation are forever 
barred as section 301 claims.  
C. How NHL Players Can Circumvent Section 301 Preemption on 
Negligence Claims 
																																								 																				
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) (asserting that “in enacting § 301 Congress 
intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules”). 
204. The statute of limitations for the majority of states is two years or more for torts. See Chart: 
Statutes of Limitation in All 50 States, NOLO (last updated Sep. 18, 2015), http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/statute-of-limitations-state-laws-chart-29941.html.  
205.  2005 CBA, supra note 137, at Art. 17.2(a)–(b).  
206.  See Oakes, supra note 35, at 204. 
207.  National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, https://www.nlrb.g 
ov/resources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Aug. 20, 2017). 
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The cases analyzed throughout this Note provide insight into the methods 
players can employ to circumvent section 301 preemption. As evidenced, 
the paramount and most obvious method of circumventing section 301 
preemption is to assert a claim that will not require interpretation of the 
CBA. However, this is easier said than done. Concussion Injury shows that, 
at the very least, players can survive a motion to dismiss when the face of 
the complaint does not include any reference to a CBA.208 For negligence 
claims, this may be difficult if the CBA is very specific regarding the duties 
that are voluntarily assumed by the league.209 Therefore, the complaint must 
specifically note that the general duties of care assumed by the NHL either 
arose independently of any CBA provision or arose solely under state law.210  
Although the CBA may contain provisions that outline the NHL’s 
voluntarily assumed duties of care, players can attempt to invoke these 
duties by instead referring to other sources that also define their scope.211 
For instance, leaked e-mails by the NHL reveal that they conducted and then 
ceased a Concussion Study Group.212 Players may therefore be able to show 
that the NHL assumed a duty of care independent of the CBA by specifying 
outside documents that purport to identify the scope of the NHL’s duty. This 
strategy was successful in Brown v. National Football League, where the 
player referenced rules and manuals that were not contained within the 
CBA.213 However, the Estate attempted this same method when it pointed 
to NHL rules that penalized high sticking and fighting to no avail.214  
Despite the Estate’s attempt, the court still concluded that the claims 
were preempted by section 301 because they required CBA interpretation 
to determine whether the NHL’s duties were limited to protecting players 
from high sticks or whether the NHL’s duties were more expansive.215 
However, Concussion Injury shows that reference to other documents may 
suffice, at least at the motion to dismiss stage. Additionally, instead of 
alleging that the NHL breached a duty to keep players reasonably safe, 
players can allege that the NHL actively took steps to harm individual 
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players.216 The Estate employed this method in its amended complaint, 
which survived section 301 preemption.217 
Players can also attempt to circumvent section 301 preemption by 
alleging that the NHL violated a state law or statute. The court in Williams 
concluded that even if a CBA defines the scope of a duty of care that directly 
matches or exceeds the duty of care outlined in a state law or statute, then 
the employee simply retains two possible claims—one for a breach of 
contract under section 301 and one under the state law or statute.218 Williams 
went even further and clarified that even if the league asserts that the CBA 
requires consultation to determine if the statute governs the league’s 
conduct, section 301 preemption still doesn’t apply because mere reference 
to or consultation of the CBA is not enough to warrant preemption.219 
If the plaintiffs are retired players, they can attempt to circumvent section 
301 preemption by showing that the CBA was not in effect at the time their 
cause of action accrued.220 However, the players must be careful to specify 
the exact time period in which the injuries were sustained. If the complaint 
refers to the entire player’s career, references a time period in which a CBA 
was in effect, or is otherwise ambiguous as to when the injuries were 
sustained, the court is likely to conclude that the claims are preempted by 
section 301.221 
CONCLUSION 
Derek Boogaard died due to an accidental overdose of prescription 
painkillers.222 Because of section 301’s preemptive effect, the Estate’s 
negligence claims were transformed into breach of contract claims, which 
are subject to only a six-month statute of limitations, when they otherwise 
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would have been subject to a two-year statute of limitations period.223 The 
court converted an otherwise common law tort claim to a section 301 
claim—a claim under the NLRA, which Congress theoretically passed to 
enhance the power and rights of employees.224  
Unfortunately, section 301 preemption resulted in detrimental effects 
that Boogaard likely did not bargain for when he signed on to the CBA, and 
effects that the Estate likely did not foresee when Boogaard died. For the 
Estate and others, section 301 preemption represents a boogeyman that 
deteriorates the rights of employees. Congress can utilize their power to 
correct this wrong and restore the vision and purpose of the LMRA by 
extending the six-month statute of limitations and prohibiting certain CBA 
provisions as void as against public policy. Otherwise, players can utilize 
various methods to circumvent section 301 preemption.  
In entering a final judgment against the Estate and in favor of the NHL, 
the judge asserted “[a]lthough judgment is entered in the NHL’s favor, this 
opinion should not be read to commend how the NHL handled Boogaard’s 
particular circumstances—or the circumstances of other NHL players who 
over the years have suffered injuries from on-ice play.”225 Admonishing the 
actions of the NHL does not suffice; Congress and the courts would be wise 
to alleviate the burdens NHL players (and others) face when they attempt to 
bring tort claims against their employers.  
Tyler V. Friederich* 
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